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We provide a dynamic model of natural resource management where the optimal institutional 
structure that governs resource use changes with resource depletion. Copeland and Taylor 
(2009) analyze how characteristics of a natural resource determine whether its steady-state 
management regime is open access, communal property, or private property. We extend this 
and other studies of endogenous institutions to analyze how and when resource governance 
may change in transition to the steady state, taking into account the fixed costs of institutional 
change and the variable costs of enforcement and governance. Assuming that governance cost 
is increasing in the difference between open-access and the actual harvest, we show that open 
access can be optimal if the resource is abundant relative to its demand and/or if governance 
costs are high. Once open access is rendered inefficient due to increased resource scarcity, 
further depletion warrants institutional change. In the face of set-up costs, optimal governance 
implies non-monotonic resource dynamics. These findings help to explain the co-evolution of 
resource scarcity and property rights—from open access to common property and beyond. We 
also extend the Demsetz/Copeland-Taylor theory of price-induced institutional change to 
include changing scarcity during the transition to the steady state.  
 
JEL Codes: D23, O13, Q20 
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A variety of institutional forms exists for the management of natural resources around the world, 
ranging from open access (no property), common property, private property, and state property. 
A large body of literature in institutional and resource economics has emerged to explain why 
different management regimes prevail for different natural resources (wildlife, land, non-
renewable resources, and renewable resources) at different times and places.
1 Despite the fact 
that this literature is overwhelmingly oriented to renewable resources (especially forests, 
fisheries, water and grazing land), it has largely abstracted from the relationship between 
institutional change and resource dynamics.   
 
Many case studies and anecdotes suggest that institutional change may be associated with 
resource scarcity. While open access characterizes the organization of some resources for long 
periods, many resources exhibit shifts in their property-right regimes as resource scarcity 
changes over time. It is this dynamic aspect of institutional change that this paper aims to address.  
The reason that “no type of governance system has been shown to be successful in all 
implementations” (Ostrom 2007) is presumably that no institution is appropriate for all types of 
renewable resources at all times and at all places. We show how different governing structures of 
the same resource may be appropriate at different stages of a resource’s evolution, taking into 
account the dynamics of natural resource and resource scarcity, as well as the costs of 
institutional change. 
 
Demsetz (1967) famously sketched and illustrated an economic theory of property rights. 
However, formalization and verification of Demsetz’s central proposition—that a new institution 
emerges when its benefit exceeds the cost—has only recently begun to emerge (section 2). Some 
studies analyze the optimal timing of institutional change by incorporating a one-time fixed-cost 
of adopting resource governance.  Because these models abstract from resource dynamics, or do 
not feature resource extraction as a control variable, changes in resource scarcity do not play a 
role in institutional change. Copeland and Taylor (2009) provide a general model of resource 
management with explicit variable costs of monitoring harvests in their comparison of “Hardin” 
(open access), “Ostrom” (common property), and “Clark” (private property) management 
regimes, and analyze resource characteristics that determine which governance form will prevail 
in the steady state. This provides a solid foundation for institutional choice across resources, but 
does not capture how governance of a particular resource may change as resource scarcity 
changes over time as resource is extracted.  
 
Our objective is to focus on the evolution of resource governance in transition to and the steady 
state. Building on the literature of endogenous property rights, we develop a dynamic resource-
use model of how governance of a resource evolves over time depending on resource scarcity as 
well as changes in the surrounding economic environment.  We solve the model for the optimal 
allocation in the presence of both fixed costs of institutional change and variable costs of 
maintaining governance. 
 
We find conditions under which institutional change occurs as a resource stock is depleted (or 
increases). Not surprisingly, open access is optimal at all stock levels if governance costs are 
                                                 
1 . A branch of such literature is referred to as the economics of common property resources or the economics of 
common property regimes (e.g. Bromley, 1992). 
- 2 - high enough. Otherwise, optimal governance involves switching from open access to governance 
as the resource is depleted. The dynamics of resource scarcity—as represented by the shadow 
value of resource—depend on the nature of governance costs. With zero fixed costs of 
institutional change, governance is adopted, and open access abandoned, once the resource has 
been depleted to its steady-state level. The steady-state stock is lower than the first-best level – 
with zero governance costs – as long as variable governance costs are positive. Both the resource 
stock and its shadow price change monotonically over time.  
 
In contrast, if institutional change requires positive set-up costs, then overshooting occurs. Open 
access is allowed until the resource stock falls below its steady-state level, after which harvesting 
is restricted until the stock recovers to the steady state. That is, fixed costs of institutional change 
result in a non-monotonic profile of the optimal resource stock. We also show that non-
monotonic resource use can occur when the demand for the harvested good increases 
exogenously over time.  
 
Libecap (2008) observes that the assignments of property rights tend to be delayed in many 
cases: they are adopted only after resource degradation has taken place.  Our non-monotonicity 
result indicates that, given the cost of institutional change, the observed delay is not necessarily 
inefficient. The result is also consistent with studies that posit and discuss a Natural Resource 
Kuznets Curve for forests (Panayatou 1993, Foster and Rosenzweig 2003), fisheries,
2 and other 
natural resources (Krautkraemer, 1994; and Roumasset et al., 2007). 
 
Our analysis also describes how the timing of institutional change depends on the costs and 
benefits of resource management. In particular, the optimal timing is delayed if the harvest price 
is larger or if the cost of governance is larger. While a higher price increases the gains from 
institutional change, higher governance costs indicate lower net benefits of institutional change.  
 
The exercises that follow help to illuminate how resource scarcity is related to property rights 
and how this relationship depends on governance costs. Governance may start early in the course 
of optimal resource depletion or may never occur. In the latter case, the problem is that Hardin’s 
(1968, p. 1247) “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” is too costly.
3 Our analysis 
supplements Taylor’s (2008) dynamic, open-access model of bison depletion of a small open 
economy facing an exogenous world price of the resource (bison hides) by providing a 
comparative institutional framework in a similar context. We find conditions under which the 
efficient property rights regime would remain in open access. The same framework is suitable 
for comparing efficient governance paths across different resources. By characterizing 
institutional change as the optimal outcome in the presence of governance costs, this study also 
contributes to the literature on organizational evolution.  Most existing studies on this topic 
assume non-rational resource users in evolutionary-game frameworks (e.g. Sethi and 
                                                 
2 The trends in abundance and biomass of Atlantic herring from the Northeast Fisheries Science Center surveys 
indicate a U shape, with a decline in the 1960s and an increase in the late 1980s (New England Fishery Management 
Council 2002). 
3 Although Hardin is often associated with central government control, his 1968 article has an entire subsection 
entitled “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon,” which could apply equally well to common property governance 
by a community. 
- 3 - Somanathan 1996). Our framework allows a complementary result; since open access is not 
necessarily a tragedy, it does not necessarily result from behavioral anomalies.  
 
In what follows, section 2 reviews the theory of institutional change and a number of case studies 
that indicate the role of resource scarcity in institutional change. Section 3 describes a general, 
dynamic model of natural resource use with explicit costs of resource governance. Section 4 
explains the main results of the paper regarding the evolution of resource governance over time. 
Section 5 concludes the paper with suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Case studies and theory of institutional change 
While open access characterizes the organization of some common pool resources for long 
periods, many resources experience shifts in their property-right regimes as resource scarcity 
changes over time. One class of examples demonstrates the transition from open access to 
common property. The lobster fishery in Maine provides an illustrative example.  Back in the 
colonial period, lobsters were abundant and managed as an open access resource. As an 
Economist article documents, a group of Massachusetts servants became so “fed up” with their 
diet of lobster that they took their owners to court and won a judgment that it not be served to 
them more than three times a week.
4 As the demand for lobster increased, local lobstermen 
started to organize themselves (the “lobster gangs” in Maine, Acheson 1988) in order to exclude 
outsiders from lobstering and to restrict their own harvesting, thereby avoiding rent dissipation 
due to open access.  Ample evidence suggests institutional change from open access to restricted 
access (Ostrom 1990, Scott 2008) including the rural land use in Switzerland and Germany 
(Netting 1981); Groundwater use in Southern California (Ostrom 1965); fishing cooperatives in 
Japan (Platteau and Seki 2000); watersheds (“Ahupua`a”) in Hawaii (La Croix and Roumasset 
1990); and oil field unitization (Libecap 1989).   
 
One of the most famous institutional transitions from common to private property concerns the 
enclosures in England and Wales, especially during the “long 16
th century” and from the late 18
th 
to the mid-19
th centuries. The early enclosures were partly an economic response to higher wages 
and rising wool prices. Later, intensification of crop production was more important (Moore, 
1966; North and Thomas, 1971; McCloskey, 1976; Allen, 1983). Forest land (Iriaichi) in rural 
villages in Japan also was converted from community to private-property management after the 
Second World War (McKean 1986, Kijima et al. 2000). 
 
What explains emergence of property right regimes? Demsetz (1967) has suggested that they 
emerge when the benefits of reduced rent-dissipation exceed their costs. Thus tribal hunting 
rights for beaver among the Montagnes who inhabited large regions around Quebec were 
established when trade with Europe increased the effective demand for beaver pelts beyond the 
point where the gains of internalization became larger than the costs. In contrast, Native-
Americans in the Southwest did not establish private hunting rights over bison, due in large part 
to the high costs of internalization resulting from the migratory patterns of the animals. This 
seminal paper left many questions for other economists to explore. What should be included in 
benefits and costs of institutional change? When will an institution change from one form to 
another? Is it current benefits and costs that are critical to the timing of institutional change or 
the present value thereof? Is it possible to classify resources according to which institution will 
                                                 
4 “Pots of Flesh,” The Economist July 1, 2004.  
- 4 - be optimal for each resource? Are there conditions under which property or the lack thereof will 
always be more efficient than other institutions? If so, what kind of property? 
 
The benefits of institutional change are implicitly equated with the losses of open access in a 
first-best setting. What should be included in the costs of change has been largely answered by 
assumption. Most of the literature on the economics of property rights after Demsetz has equated 
the costs of institutional change with monitoring and enforcement costs.
5  North and Thomas 
(1971) and Davis and North (1971) are exceptions in this regard, comparing the net benefits of 
institutional change with the political costs of changing the rules.
6 In what follows, we abstract 




The question of timing has been only partially answered. For a one-time fixed-cost investment, 
Anderson and Hill (1975, 1990) showed that private property would efficiently emerge when the 
present value of reduced rent dissipation net of enforcement costs is maximized. This helped to 
concretize the costs of institutional change and bring some dynamics into the picture. One entry 
point for resource economics into the theory of institutional change was the dramatic depletion of 
bison in the American West. Lueck (2002) models bison as a renewable resource and shows that 
the optimal transition from open access to the first-best property rights regime is sooner where 
the rents from resource use are higher and if the exogenously fixed cost of resource governance 
is lower.
8 These studies solve for optimal timing of property-right enforcement by taking the 
benefits of enforcement as given and independent of enforcement timing. We regard the benefits 
and costs of one institution relative to another dependent on the corresponding trajectories of 
stocks and hence endogenous. Taylor (2008) provides a model of renewable resources and 
combines it with the assumption that the price of bison hides was fixed by the European leather 
market. He finds that open-access depletion closely tracks actual depletion rates up to the near 
extinction of the species. 
 
Other discussions focus on which institution – common property, private property, or no 
property – may be preferred to others. Demsetz (1967) cited anthropological evidence showing 
that both the Montagnes and the “Indians of the Labrador Peninsula had a long-established 
tradition of property in land,” established in the colonial period. Ostrom (1990 and 1998) helped 
to cast the “common property resource” problem as one of comparative institutions (as had been 
encouraged by Coase, e.g. 1988 and 1998) by noting that neither private property nor Hardin’s 
                                                 
5 Anderson and Hill (1975 and 1990) consider the fixed cost of property enforcement (fencing). Deininger (2003) 
and Copeland and Taylor (2008) focus on the variable costs of enforcement and monitoring. See also Eggertsson 
(1990) for a comprehensive review and several examples. 
6 Accordingly, institutional change is said to come about when the benefits thereof exceed the (political) costs to the 
primary action group.  
7 In the early days of the New Institutional Economics, Demsetz (1967) and North and Thomas (1973) viewed 
institutional change as the spontaneous product of benefit-cost calculus. Later, North (e.g. 1981) spelled out the role 
of the state in fomenting appropriate or inappropriate institutional change. 
8 Governance costs are modeled as a one-time fixed cost of switching from open access to first-best resource 
management. Instead of solving for the time path of the first-best stock independently, as in Lueck (2002), our 
model solves simultaneously for both optimal harvest and governance. The resource is harvested according to open 
access until the stock becomes sufficiently scarce that second-best governance becomes optimal.  
- 5 - (1968, 1978) Leviathan (state control) should be viewed as “the only way” and by advancing 
community management as an alternative institution. 
 
Alston and Mueller (2003) have suggested that open access and private property are fully 
equivalent if land is sufficiently remote from the market and if enforcement costs are zero. For 
land closer to the market, property will be worthwhile if the increased value associated with the 
instillation of high-powered incentives brings benefits greater than the enforcement costs of 
enforcement. They further note that the intermediate form of common property may be preferred 
in situations where its benefits net of organizational costs (including enforcement) are higher 
than private property. Libecap (1989) enumerates factors that contribute to the success (or 




Until the seminal work by Copeland and Taylor (2009), these comparative studies did not 
incorporate the dynamics of optimal resource use. Copeland and Taylor’s model incorporated the 
costs of enforcing property rights in the form of the costs of monitoring harvests by resource 
users. Their steady-state analysis illuminates how the optimal institution is determined by the 
characteristics of the resource and the users of the resource (discount rate of resource users, 
intrinsic biological growth rate of renewable resources, population size, monitoring costs, harvest 
technology, and the demand for the harvest).
10 Our analysis aims at optimal governance of a 
particular resource over time as well as some applications of institutional choice across resources.  
 
3. A model of institutional change  
Consider a renewable resource management problem with an exogenous demand for harvest and 
governance costs. The term governance refers to any forms of harvest restrictions to a level 
below what would prevail under open access. Without governance, the resource would be open 
access and experience eventual rent dissipation. The resource manager's objective is to maximize 
the present value of the resource rents by choosing the dynamic harvest profile, taking into 
account the cost of governance. This section presents the assumptions of the model.  
 
Resource dynamics 
Let   be the stock of a renewable resource at time  . Without harvest, the growth of the 
resource stock at time   is given by   where   for all 
t S t
(S F t ) ( t S F 0 > ) ) (0,K S ∈ ,  , 
and  . The parameter   represents the carrying capacity of the resource. Without 
harvest, 
0 = ) ( = (0) K F F
0 < ′ F′ 0 > K
K  would be the long-term steady-state stock whenever the initial stock is positive. 
 
Net benefits of resource use 
Let  >0 represent the harvest at time t. Given  , the net (flow) benefit of resource use for the 
society at time   is given by the consumer surplus associated with the resource good minus the 
cost of harvesting:  
t x t x
t
                                                 
9 See Dixit (2004) for a concise summary of Libecap’s (1989) discussion of preconditions for successful and 
unsuccessful group cooperation regarding mineral rights in California, oil fields in Texas, fisheries, and federal land 
policies in late nineteenth century western U.S. 
10 Several other studies (e.g. Hotte, Long and Tian 2000, Margolis and Shogren 2009) investigate the effect of an 
increase in the resource price on institutional change using static or steady-state analysis.  
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where P  is an inverse demand function and   the unit harvesting cost function. The inverse 
demand 
c
P  is continuously differentiable with  0 ≤ ′ P . We assume that P  is stationary over time. 
(We will discuss the effect of changes in demand in section 4.3.) The unit harvesting cost 
function c is decreasing and convex in stock, and satisfies  0 < ) (S c′ ,  0 > ) (S c ′ ′  for all S, and 
.  ∞ = → limS ) S ( 0 c
 
Costs of Constitutional Governance 
Without enforcement or governance, the resource is open access: harvest will continue to the 
point where the rent diminishes to zero. The associated harvest   satisfies   oa x
    ). ( = )) ( ( S c S x P oa
Open access harvest   at time t depends on the stock level at time   as long as unit harvest 
cost c is stock-dependent and  . 
oa x t
0 < ′ P
 
The model explicitly takes into account the costs of governance, i.e. of limiting harvests to a 
level below  . Governance includes the negotiation, information processing and enforcement 
regarding harvesting rules (what, who, when, and how); decision-making; monitoring, bonding, 
and sanctions; and conflict resolution. For example, homogeneity of group membership lowers 
the costs of designing and enforcing harvesting rules in accordance with member differences in 
harvesting capacity (Libecap, 1989; Dixit, 2004).  
oa x
 
While some of the governance costs are recurrent in nature, implementing governance (or 
institutional change) involves a one-time investment. In many cases governance involves a 
lumpy investment, and the timing of investment determines the evolution of institutions. In fact, 
many previous models of institutional change focused on the timing of investment (e.g. 
Anderson and Hill 1990, Lueck and Miceli 2007). Hence, we consider both the fixed and the 
variable costs of governance. Let C ≥0 be the investment cost of institutional change. Let G be 
the variable (or recurrent) governance cost. Once investment is made at time T, the variable cost 
G at each time  ≥T depends on the difference between the open-access harvest level and the 
actual harvest at time t. We also assume that G is a linear function:  
t
  ), ) ( ( = ) ; ( oa t oa oa t x S x g x x G −  
where   is a constant. The further the resource manager restricts the harvest, the larger the 




− − − +
T
t t oa
t T dt x S x g e C e . ) ) ( (
ρ ρ  
 
4. Optimal resource governance 
4.1 Resource scarcity and institutional change 
The social planner's optimization problem in the presence of governance costs is:
11 
                                                 
11 The optimal solution to the above problem corresponds to the “second best” in the sense of Dixit (1996), i.e. 
optimal in the presence of transaction costs. 
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0 0 ω ω
ρ
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given  . In this problem, the fixed governance cost C is assumed to be zero. The case 
where C>0, as well as the role of C in institutional change, is discussed in section 4.2. What is 
different from a standard renewable-resource management model is the presence of governance 
costs, g, and the constraint that harvest does not exceed the open-access level,  . The 
maximum principle implies the following conditions for optimality:  
] (0, 0 K S ∈
) ( t oa t S x x ≤
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t S e λ
ρ
t λ  is the current-value shadow 
price of resource stock at time  . From the left-hand side of condition (1), we see that raising g 
has the effect of lowering the marginal harvesting cost by the same amount. When the first order 
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In general, dynamic resource economic models with downward sloping demand and nonlinear 
harvesting cost may have multiple steady-state equilibria (Clark and Munro 1975).  What follows 
is one of the main results of this paper, which holds even when there are multiple steady states.  
 
Proposition 1 Suppose  . There is a threshold marginal governance cost level  K S = 0 0 > g  such 
that (i) open access at all   (i.e.   for all  ) is optimal if  t ) ( = t oa t S x x t g g ≥ ; (ii) it is optimal to 
adopt governance and restrict harvest at a level lower than the open-access level for sufficiently 
large t if  g g < .  
 
See the appendix for the proof and remarks regarding the nature of the optimal harvest path and 
uniqueness of the steady state. Here we explain an intuition behind this result. Part (i) holds 
because the present value of the governance cost,  , exceeds the present 
value of total surplus from resource use,  , for any harvest path if 
the marginal governance cost is sufficiently large. Part (ii) implies that the optimal resource use 
may involve open access when the resource stock is abundant, followed by harvest below the 
open-access level as the stock converges to a steady-state level. This result follows because the 
constraint   can be binding only when stock level is large. The phase diagram in 
Figure 1 illustrates a case where part (ii) applies. The figure assumes an inverse demand 
, a simple unit harvesting cost c(S) = c/S, and a resource growth function given by a 
logistic function , where   is the intrinsic rate of resource growth and 
dt x S x g e t t oa
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x
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x P / 1 ) ( =
) / 1 ( K S rS −
- 8 - 0 > K  the carrying capacity of the resource. The parameter values are  03 . 0 = ρ ,  ,  5 = c 5 . 0 = r , 
, and  . 10 = K 3 = g
12 The curve ODAC represents the open-access harvest level   at each 
stock level. The curves OE and BAE represent the optimal trajectories (the stable arm of the 
Euler equation system 3) when the constraint 
) (S xoa
) ( t oa t S x x ≤  is not binding. The steady state S* is 
about 6.51, with the steady-state harvest level x*=1.14. In this example,  g g <  (as defined in 
Proposition 1) and the constraint   is binding for   =8.22. Hence, the arrows 
CAE indicate the optimal harvest path given S0=K. The optimal harvest level equals the open-
access level (i.e. no governance) until the stock level hits  , beyond which the optimal harvest 
is lower than  as the stable arm indicates.  




) ( t oa S x
                                                
 
 
Figure 1: A case where open access is optimal when stock is large. 
3
2 4 6 8
 
Thus Proposition 1 implies that resource scarcity induces governance in the optimal solution. It 
indicates that the governance institution of a resource is not necessarily a fixture throughout the 
resource’s life cycle. As we observe with many cases studies listed in section 2, institutional 
changes occur, and the changes involve transitions from open access with no governance to 
common property and to private property.  
 
While the above analysis demonstrates endogenous institutional change, we are not able to 
derive further analytical results regarding the dynamics of institutions, e.g. how governance 
responds to particular parameters. While the level of governance ( ) increases 
monotonically over time in the above example, the generality of this result is not certain. A 
model with a fixed harvest price in the following section allows us to investigate such questions. 
)
*
oa x ) ( t t x S −
 
 
12 In order to make the objective function bounded, we assume that the inverse demand is bounded at a sufficiently 
small level of harvest, i.e. P(x)=P(ε) for all positive x≤ε for some small ε>0. This assumption does not influence the 
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- 9 - 4.2 Institutional change in a model with exogenous prices 
 
4.2.1 Optimal governance 
A constant harvest price is an assumption applicable to a local small-scale natural resource 
taking the market price of harvest as given. A constant harvest price also applies to a small-open 
economy, applicable to many case studies including the hunting of bison and beaver pelts 
(Demsetz 1967, Taylor 2008) in the United States. As we will see below, an analysis with this 
assumption generates rich results regarding if and when institutional change is optimal given the 
cost of governance. Thus our analysis here deals with a resource manager’s rent-maximization 
problem, taking into account the costs of governance. We consider two types of governance cost: 
the fixed cost C>0 and marginal governance cost g>0.  
 
Let p>0 be the constant harvest price. Assume that  0 ) ( ≥ − K c p , that is, harvesting can generate 
positive rents at a resource stock level sufficiently large. The social planner's objective function 
is the present value of the flow of rents from resource use minus governance costs:  
  .  {} [] dt x x g x S c p e t oa t t
t ) ( ) (




Suppose that the maximum harvest rate  0 > x  is given at each instant (perhaps due to the finite 
number of resource users even under open access). We assume that  x  exceeds the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY,  ).  Let  ) ( max0 S F K S≤ ≤ S  be the steady-state stock level associated with 
open access:  0 = ) (S c p− . Such S  exists under the assumption on c. The open-access harvest 








; = ) (
; < 0
= ) (
S S if x
S S if S F
S S if
S xoa  
Because  x  exceeds the maximum sustainable yield, continued open access implies that the stock 
converges to S, where complete rent dissipation occurs.
13 Given governance costs, the social 
planner’s problem is to maximize the present value of resource rents by choosing the timing of 
investment and a time path of harvests if governance is adopted: 
{} [] ∫ ∫
∞
− − − − − − + − −
T






dt x S x g x S c p e C e dt S x S c p e ) ) ( ( ) ( ) ( )] ( [ max
0
,
ρ ρ ρ  






, > ) (
; 0 ) (
= . .
T t for x S F





  , ) ( 0 t all for S x x t oa t ≤ ≤  
given  . In the remainder of the analysis, we assume that  ] (0, 0 K S ∈ K S ≈ 0  in order to describe 
the optimal resource allocation starting at a time when the resource is untouched. 
 
The first term of the objective function represents the rents while open access is allowed. The 
second term is the present value of the investment cost when institutional change occurs at time 
T. The last term represents the present value of rents upon governance. 
                                                 
13 If harvest under open access were not bounded, then the stock would adjust to S instantly given any initial stock 
level greater than S. As is typically assumed (e.g. Smith 1968), we assume that harvest under open access is bounded.  
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If C=G=0 (no governance costs), this problem would be reduced to a widely used, standard 
renewable resource management model (Clark 1990). Because the objective function and the 
state dynamics is linear in the control variable, the solution would be the most rapid approach 
path to the steady state where g=0 (Spence and Starrett 1975). In what follows we demonstrate 
that (1) the optimal solution given g>0 continues to be the most rapid approach path as long as 
the investment cost C is zero; (2) however, the optimal solution is not a most rapid approach path 
and generates a non-monotonic resource stock transition in the presence of the investment cost C.   
 
Case 1: No fixed cost 
First suppose C=0 (no fixed cost for institutional change). Observe that the integrand can be 
rewritten as {  Hence, the marginal governance cost  } . ) ( oa t t gx x S c g p − − + g  has two effects: (1) 
it effectively increases the marginal benefit (or the marginal revenue) of harvesting (from  p  to 
g p+ ); and (2) it decreases the instantaneous rent (by  ).  oa gx
 
The singular solution   satisfies the following equation:  
* S
    0. )] ( )][ ( [ ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * * = − + ′ − − ′ − ≡ Φ S c g p S F S F S c S ρ
There is a stock level S  at which  ′ ) ( = S c g p ′ +  due to the assumption on c, and hence 
. Because Φ is continuous and  0 > ) (S′ Φ 0 < ) (K Φ , a solution to   exists between S 0 = ) (
* S Φ ′ 
and K . With the additional assumption  , there is a unique solution. 0 < ) (
* S Φ′ 14  If  S S <
* , then 
 is not approachable even under open access and hence the optimal solution is open access 
with no governance at all t.  
* S
 
If  S S ≥
* , then the optimal solution is one of the following two that generates the larger present 
value.   
1.  (With governance) Choose   as long as   and   when  . That is, 
choose 
oa x
* > S St ) (
* * S F x ≡
* = S St
x  until the stock decreases to  , and then choose   forever.  
* S
* x
2.  (Without governance) Choose   at all t. That is, choose  oa x x  until the stock decreases to 
S , and then choose   forever.   oa x
 
The present value with governance (the first case) is  
  {} .
) ( )] ( [
) ( =
* * *
) , , (









ρ x x g x S c p
e dt x S c p e







− − ∫  
where  ) , , (
*
0 x S S τ  is the time it takes the resource of size   to reach the open-access level   
given constant harvest rate 
0 S
* S
x :  
                                                 
14 Function Φ has a negative first-order derivative if functions c and F take commonly assumed functional forms 
(c(S)=c/S and F is logistic ( ) or is a Gompertz growth function  ).   ) / 1 ( ) ( K S rS S F − = ) / ln( ) ( S K rS S F =
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The present value with no governance (the second case) is  
  {}
* ) , , (
0 , ) ( = ) ( =
0
S S x S F S where dt x S c p e o t t t
t x S S




Therefore, the present value under the optimal solution is given by  } , { max ng g Π Π . By canceling 
out the common elements in   and the first term of  ng Π g Π , we obtain the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2  
In the constant price model, suppose C=0.  Given any initial stock  , the optimal solution 
involves positive governance costs if and only if 
*
0 S S ≥
{} . ) ( = ) (
) ( )] ( [ ) , , (
0
* * * *
x S F S where dt x S c p e
x x g x S c p
t t t
t x S S
oa − − ≥




If the inequality holds, then (i) the optimal investment timing for institutional change from open 
access to governance is given by  ) , , (
*
0 x S S τ ; (ii) the resource stock decreases monotonically to 
the steady state; (iii) the shadow price of resource increases monotonically to the steady-state 
level; and (iv) the steady state S* is smaller than the first best level that would prevail if g=0.  
 
Figure 2 describes a case where the above condition holds. Under optimal governance, harvest is 
restricted to the steady-state level x* before the stock reaches the open access level S .  The stock 
is maintained at the singular solution  , and generates positive rents.  
* S
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Note: The figure is based a constant-price model in section 4.2. The parameter values are ρ= 0.03, c(S) = 1/S, p=2, 














































Figure 2: Optimal governance for a constant-price model. 
 
 
Figure 3 describes the dynamics of the rent and the shadow price of the resource under transition 
to governance. The rent is defined by p-c(St)+g, the marginal net benefit of harvesting in each 
instant.  The shadow price is the costate variable associated with the resource stock under the 
optimal solution, and is equal to the derivative of the value function. Given constant harvest 
price and  , the rent decreases over time as stock is depleted. This fact may appear 
inconsistent with the conjecture that increased resource scarcity induces institutional change. 
However, this puzzle is resolved if we look at the dynamics of the shadow price of the 
resource—the fundamental measurement of resource scarcity.  In fact, the shadow price 
increases as resource becomes scarce (Proposition 2 part iii). They converge to the steady-state 
value when the stock reaches the steady state level (at time t=3.16 in this case). While the rent 
decreases monotonically on the transition path, the shadow price increases monotonically, 
reflecting increased resource scarcity. 
0 '< c
 












Note: The figure is based on a constant-price model with the parameter values used for Figure 2. 
Figure 3: Rent and shadow price under transition to governance (C=0). 
 
Case 2: Positive fixed cost 
In the presence of fixed investment cost, the most rapid approach path is not optimal. 
 
Proposition 3 In the constant price model, suppose   (the steady state when governance is 
adopted) and adopting a governance structure involves a fixed-cost investment  . 
*
0 > S S
C
(i)  Adopting governance is optimal if  
  . )] ( [
)) ( ( ) ( )] ( [ ) , , * (
0
* * *
dt x S c p e
S F x g S F S c p
C t








where   and 
*
0 = S S x S F S t t − ) ( = &  on the right-hand side. 
(ii)  When adopting governance is optimal, the optimal timing of investment implies a 
non-monotonic stock path: the resource stock falls below  , and then increases to 




Part (i) follows by comparing the present values under open access versus under governance.  
Part (ii) follows because the marginal net benefit of delaying governance is positive when the 
stock level is the steady state under governance.   We provide a brief sketch of this result (see the 
appendix for a complete proof). At an arbitrary time T, the marginal benefit of delaying 
governance is a sum of two components: (1) the marginal increase in rents from resource use by 
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+ − + − . 
Here the opportunity cost arises because (1) the stock decreases at rate  x S F T − ) (  under open 
access; and (2) under governance, it takes longer for a smaller stock to return to the steady state. 
Evaluating the marginal costs and benefits at the steady-state stock level S*, we observe that the 
marginal benefit of delaying exceeds the marginal cost by an amount  . Hence, if C>0 
and if governance is optimal, then the optimal resource transition exhibits non-monotonicity: the 
resource is driven down to a level below the steady state, investment for governance is made and 
harvest is restricted to zero until the stock recovers to the steady-state level, and then the harvest 
is controlled at the steady-state level   thereafter. Thus, even without exogenous price 
shocks, it is optimal to allow the stock to fall below the steady-state level—there is a benefit 
from delaying governance due to the investment cost for institutional change.  
0 > C e
Tρ
ρ −
* * = ) ( x S F
 
 
Note: The figure is based a constant-price model in section 4.2. The parameter values are 
ρ= 0.1, c(S) = 1/S, p=2, r=0.5, K=10,  x  = 1.37, C= 7.9, g=0, and  10 0 = S . 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
20
25
(a) Present value of governance as a function of investment timing




(b) Second best stock path












(a) Present value of resource use
(Solid line: present value as a function of governance investment timing)
(Broken line: present value under open access)
Figure 4: Resource Kuznets Curve: Overshooting given an investment cost for institutional 
change. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates a case where governance is optimal. Panel (a) represents the present values of 
governance as a function of investment timing (the solid line) and under open access (the broken 
line). Notice that the present value of governance increases even after stock reaches the steady 
state level (at t=21.3). The optimal investment timing is T*=29.5, when it becomes optimal to 
restrict harvest (to zero) so that stock grows back to the steady state level. This example 
illustrates an interesting case where adopting governance when the stock reaches the steady-state 
- 15 - level   for the first time generates a lower present value than open access while adopting 
governance at the optimal timing T* is superior to open access. Panel (b) describes the dynamics 
of the resource stock while panel (c) plots the (variable) governance cost over time. Both 
dynamics are non-monotonic because of overshooting. 
* S
 
This overshooting result is consistent with Libecap’s (2008) observation that, in many cases,  
property rights are adopted to natural resource management only after resource is sufficiently 
degraded. As the panel in the middle illustrates, it is also consistent with empirical observations 
of a natural resource Kuznets Curve whereby a resource stock such as standing timber is 
depleted and later built back up, albeit not to its first-best steady state (e.g. Panayatou 1993, 
Foster and Rosenzweig 2003).    
 
4.2.2 Governance costs and the timing of institutional change 
What follows is a number of observations regarding if and when switching from open access to 
governance is optimal. Proposition 4 provides conditions under which governance will 
eventually emerge under optimal resource management. 
 
Proposition 4 If transition to governance (from open access) is optimal given  g  >0, then it is 
optimal for any g< g . If transition to governance is optimal given C>0, then it is optimal for any 
C<C. If transition to governance is optimal given  p >0, then it is optimal for any p> p . 
 
The figure assumes ρ = 0.03, c(S) = 1/S, F(S) = rS(1-S/K) with r = 0.5, K = 1,  x  = 2.5 (= 
2*MSY), and S0=K. p ranges from 0.11 to 3, and g from 0 to 3. 




























g (Marginal governance cost)
Figure 4: Institutional change and marginal governance cost. 
 
See the appendix for the proof. Proposition 4 states that the gains from adopting governance is 
decreasing in the governance costs and increasing in the harvest price, as illustrated in Figures 4 
and 5. Figure 4 describes the relationship between institutional change, harvest price, and 
marginal governance cost. Given S0=K, transition to governance is optimal if the parameter 
values fall under the upper triangular region in the figure. The higher the harvest price and the 
lower the governance cost g, the larger the net benefit of governance over open access.  
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The figure assumes ρ = 0.03, c(S) = 1/S, F(S) = rS(1-S/K) with r = 0.5, K = 1,  x  = 2.5 (= 





























C (Cost of adopting governance)      
Figure 5: Institutional change and the fixed cost of adopting governance 
 
Figure 5 describes the relationship between institutional change, harvest price, and the fixed cost 
of adopting governance. Again, eventual transition to governance is preferred to perpetual open 
access if the harvest price is high or if investment cost is small.   
 
Proposition 5 addresses the timing of the institutional change when the conditions of Proposition 
4 hold.  
 
Proposition 5 









 provided T*>0. For sufficiently large g, governance is not optimal ( ∞ =







T  provided T*>0. For sufficiently large C, governance is not optimal 
( ∞ =








 provided T*>0.  
 
See the appendix for the proof. This proposition holds because the optimal steady-state stock 
decreases and the time it takes for resource to reach the steady-state level increases as p increases. 
Similarly, the optimal switching time is later if g is larger because the steady state under 
governance is decreasing in the marginal governance cost. With g large enough, perpetual open 
access is optimal and governance never adopted. 
 
4.2.3 Comparative advantage between common and private property institutions 
So far, we study institutional change from open access to a generic governance structure with 
fixed and variable costs of governance. Here we distinguish two major forms of governance: 
- 17 - common property and private property. Let   ( ) be the fixed governance cost of introducing 
common (private) property and   ( ) be the corresponding marginal governance cost. We 
assume that the fixed cost is lower and the variable cost is larger under common property: 
c C p C
c g p g
p c p c g g C C > < , . 
While implementing private property is more costly than initiating collective action under 
common property, governance under private property is less costly.     
 
Figure 6 illustrates the optimal institutional change when both common and private property 
regimes are available.  
 
 
The figure assumes ρ = 0.05, p=1, c(S) = 1/S, r= 0.8, K=10,  x  = 2*MSY 
=4, S0 = K, and Cc=gp=0. Axes measure Cp – Cc  (investment cost) 
between 0 and 40, and gc –gp between 0 and 2. 


















Figure 6: Open access, common property versus private property. 
 
Common property is preferred if its marginal governance cost is smaller than the marginal 
governance cost under private property. Private property is preferred if its fixed governance cost 
is small relative to the fixed cost of adopting common property.  
 
One can also use figure 6 as a heuristic for interpreting the role of prices and relative governance 
costs in institutional change.
16 First note from the equation for the separating line that common 
property has a comparative advantage over private property when the fixed cost of private 
governance is greater than about 40 times the variable cost of governance. This condition 
determines which form of governance emerges, if either. We now combine that with the 
conditions on the size of the dominant open access rectangle. The higher the price, the smaller is 
the rectangle.  
 
                                                 
16 Copeland and Taylor (2009) have an elaborate discussion on which institution prevails in the steady state. 





















- 18 - Under the assumption of fixed harvest price, there is at most one institutional change from open 
access to either common property or private property, but not sequential change from open 
access to common property and then to private property. Suppose adopting common property at 
time T is optimal. Then it would be optimal to keep the resource stock at S* (given common 
property) from time T on.  Because nothing changes after time T (the shadow value, harvest, and 
stock stay constant), it cannot be the case that adopting private property at some time T’ >T is 
optimal. (See section 5 for a discussion about sequential institutional change.)  
 
4.3 Institutional change due to price shocks 
It turns out that unexpected increase in harvest price can cause the optimal transition of resource 
stock to be non-monotonic even if the fixed cost of institutional change is zero.  This is because 
the steady-state stock under open access decreases as harvest price increases, and not all price 
increases justify institutional change. Figure 8 describes unexpected price increases from 
 to   at t=10 and from   to  5 . 0 1 = p 1 2 = p 2 p 2 3 = p  at t=20 (panel a), with the resulting optimal 
resource stock trajectory (panel b). Given the parameter values, the optimal governance is to 
allow open access at all t when the harvest price equals   or  . Therefore, the stock decreases 
under these price levels, first to  , and then   (the steady-state stock levels under 
open access given   and  ). However, when price increases further to  , 
governance is justified: harvest is restricted to zero until the stock reaches  , the steady 















Note: The figure is based a constant-price model with no fixed cost. The parameter values are ρ= 0.03, r=0.5, K=10, 
x  = 2.5, and g=1. 
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Figure 7: Optimal governance given unexpected increases in harvest price. 
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Hence, a monotonic price increase does not necessarily induce monotonic changes in the 
resource stock. This observation is consistent with several studies that discuss intertemporal 
changes in resource stock and institutions as resource prices change. The change from   to  , 
where price increases but stock decreases, corresponds to the case of buffalo as documented in 
Taylor (2008) while the change from   (or  ) to   corresponds to the case of beaver as 
discussed in Demsetz (1967).  
1 p 2 p
1 p 2 p 3 p
 
5. Discussion   
We provide a dynamic model of natural resource governance to analyze and illustrate how 
institutional change occurs with depletion (or accumulation) of a natural resource. The analysis 
relates resource governance in the steady state to resource characteristics and economic and to 
changes in resource scarcity as the resource stock transitions to its steady state level. Restricting 
resource use below the open access harvest incurs social costs of governance. Open access is 
optimal when the resource is sufficiently abundant that the marginal user cost of harvest is less 
than the net marginal benefits of harvest (price minus unit harvesting costs plus avoided 
governance costs). For sufficiently low governance costs, however, as the resource is depleted 
the marginal user cost increases until it is equal to the marginal net benefit of harvest.  At this 
point it becomes optimal to switch from open access to positive governance and positive 
resource rents once the resource has been depleted to a specific stock level (Proposition 1). If 
governance costs are sufficiently large, the optimal resource management regime is open access 
at all resource stock levels. Inasmuch as extinction may be optimal even in first-best models 
(Spence, 1973), the presence of governance costs increases the likelihood of optimal extinction. 
 
The dynamics of resource scarcity—as represented by the shadow value of resource—depend on 
the nature of governance costs. With a constant harvest price and zero fixed costs of institutional 
change, governance is adopted, and open access ceased, once the resource has been depleted to 
its steady-state level. Both the resource stock and its shadow price change monotonically over 
time (Proposition 2). 
 
In contrast, if institutional change requires positive set-up costs, then overshooting occurs 
(Proposition 3). Open access is allowed until the resource stock falls below the steady-state level, 
and then harvest is restricted until the stock recovers to the steady state. Similarly, the dynamics 
of governance costs is also non-monotonic: they start with a low level when resource is abundant, 
followed by an increase and a decrease to the steady-state level. That is, fixed costs of 
institutional change result in a non-monotonic profile of the optimal resource stock. Such a 
transition path to the steady state is consistent with a Resource Kuznets Curve that has been 
observed with some resources (Panayatou 1993, Foster and Rosenzweig 2003). Unexpected 
monotonic increases in harvest price also imply a non-monotonic resource-stock trajectory. As 
Libecap (2008) observes, assignments of property rights tend to be delayed in many cases, where 
they are adopted only after resource degradation has taken place. Our non-monotonicity results 
indicate that the observed delay is not necessarily inefficient, given the costs of institutional 
change.  
 
- 20 - Our analysis also describes how the timing of institutional change depends on the costs and 
benefits of resource management. In particular, the optimal timing is delayed if the harvest price 
is larger or if the cost of governance is larger (Proposition 5). While a higher price increases the 
gains from institutional change, higher governance costs indicate lower net benefits of 
institutional change (Proposition 4). With multiple institutions available (such as private and 
common property), the comparative advantage institutions depends on the ratio of the difference 
in fixed costs of institutional change to the difference in the variable costs of governance. 
 
That the steady-state institutions differ for different resources has been discussed and explained 
(e.g. Copeland and Taylor 2009). Our model and simulation results characterize the timing of 
efficient institutional change for a given resource according to governance costs and resource 
scarcity. As Copeland (2005) argues, work on the effects of international trade (or price changes 
in general) on renewable resources with endogenous institutional change is still in its early stages. 
This paper’s result adds to the existing literature by describing institutional change not only due 
to changes in prices or technologies but due to endogenous change in resource scarcity.  
 
The finding that optimal institutions differ as resource scarcity changes has a number of policy 
implications. When open access and resource depletion are observed, adopting governance is not 
necessarily optimal. First, open access may be optimal at the steady state because the governance 
costs are high relative to the shadow value of the resource. Second, even if governance is optimal 
at the steady state, it may be efficient to delay governance along the transition path.  A robust 
strand of economic development literature favors the primacy of good institutions in fostering 
incentives conducive to economic growth (North 1981, North and Weingast 1989, De Soto 1989, 
De Long and Shleifer 1993, Besley 1995, Knack and Keefer 1995, Acemoglu et al. 2005, Rodrik 
1999,  Rodrik et al. 2002). “Good institutions” are typically taken to be rules that secure rights of 
exchange and foster specialization. But establishing these institutions before it is efficient to do 
so may in fact retard development and growth. Accordingly, our analysis adds to the literature by 
illustrating optimal institutional change over the course of resource development and by 
examining the optimal timing of property right introduction. Just as Ostrom (1990) has argued 
persuasively that neither Leviathan nor privatization should be regarded as “the only way” to 
effective resource management, the same can be said for secure property rights generally. 
Comparative institutional analysis requires knowing when as well as what form of governance is 
warranted. 
 
A number of extensions would be useful. One is to consider how changes in demand, harvesting 
costs, and governance costs over time influence institutional change. Another is to analyze how 
sequential transitions from open access to common property and then to private property occur 
with or without changes in demands and technologies for harvesting and governance. With 
constant price and no fixed costs, institutional change occurs only once. It may be possible to 
generate a transition from common to private property for the case of exogenous or endogenous 
increases in price or changing governance costs. We focused on explaining the optimal 
institutional changes given the cost of institutional governance. What is optimal is not 
necessarily what we observe in actual resource use. For example, as Taylor (2008) observes, an 
open access model tracks actual bison depletion in the United States very closely. What is not 
clear is whether open access is optimal given governance costs or has resulted from of political-
economy factors that are outside the scope of our study. An analysis of how competitive and 
- 21 - strategic interactions among resource users, and those between incumbent users and entrants, 
influence the equilibrium institutional changes is left for future research (see e.g., de Meza and 
Gould, 1992, Mason and Polasky 1994, Scott 2008). 
 
Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1 
Step 1. The solution without constraint  ) ( t oa t S x x ≤ . 
The necessary conditions for an interior solution includes  
  , = ) ) ( ( ) ( t t t g S c x P λ − −  (A1) 
   (A2)  ). ( ) ( ' ) ( = t t t oa t t t t S F S gx x S c ′ − + ′ − λ ρλ λ &
This is the necessary condition for the interior first best solution when the unit harvesting cost is 
 and when the constraint  g S c t − ) ( t oa t S x x ) ( ≤  is not imposed:  





⎡ − − − ∫ ∫
− ∞
) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( max
0 0 ω ω
ρ
 s.t.   . 0 , ) ( = t t t t x x S F S ≤ − &
Step 2. Unconstrained optimal harvest is increasing in stock. 
Differentiate both sides of condition (A1) with respect to t, and we have  
    . = ) ( ) ( t t t t t S S c x x P λ & & & ′ − ′
Together with condition (A2), we obtain the Euler equation for harvest:  
  .
) (
) ( ' ) ( ) ( )] ( ][ ) ( ) ( [
=
t
t oa t t t t t
t x P
S gx S F S c S F g S c x P
x
′ −
− ′ − ′ + − + − ρ &  
Similarly, the equation of motion determines the Euler equation for resource stock. Figure 1 
represents the phase diagram given these two equations. 
(In the figure,   represents the stock level such that  ρ S ) ( = ρ ρ S F′ , i.e. the steady-state stock level 
if the unit harvest cost were constant. As   from above,   must increase to infinity 
for   to hold. For  ,   at all  . Hence, the   isocline touches the   axis 
at  , and is positively sloped for  .) Observe that   at   to the right of the   
isocline, and   at   below the   isocline. Hence,   when   along the 
optimal trajectory to the steady state (the convergent separatix), as indicated in the phase 
diagram. Therefore, the optimal harvest is increasing in stock. 
ρ S St →
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0 = t x &
ρ S
ρ S St ≤
t x




= x & S
= t
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0 > t S & * > S St
Step 3.   is possible when   is large.  ) ( =
*
t oa t S x x t S
Note that the optimal harvest must not exceed the open-access level:  
  )), ( t oa t S x x ≤  
where   or  . When   is large, the curve   in the 
diagram lies below the   isocline because 
) ( )) ( ( t t oa S c S x P ≡
0 x &
)) ( ( ) (
1
t t oa S c P S x
− ≡ t S ) ( t oa S x
0 >
) (













= ) ), ( t S t S
S F g t − ′ − ′ + −ρ & . For some parameter values, the 
unconstrained optimal harvest   is close to the   isocline and hence the constraint for 
optimal governance,   can be binding.  ▄ 
* *
t x 0 = t x &
oa x t x ≤
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Remark:   
1.  When  g  is large enough, it follows that   for all   for   large enough. In such a 
case, the phase diagram would look like the following (Figure A1). With such large 
0 < t x & t x t S
g , 
the saddle path of the interior solution is qualitatively similar to the case with a smaller  g . 
With a large  g , the corner solution   for all   will be the optimal solution.   ) ( t oa S x = t x t
2.  The above diagrams are based on numerical example with a unique interior steady state. 
In general, there may be multiple steady states because   isocline may intersect the 
 isocline for twice or more. This result is well known in the resource economics 
literature (e.g. Gordon and Munro 1975). Even with multiple steady states, the statement 
of the proposition is valid when   or if   is large enough to exceed the saddle 
point associated with the largest stock level.  
0 = t x &
0 = t S &
K S = 0 0 S
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Proof of Proposition 2 (iii) 
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≡ Π , the steady-state present value of governance. 
- 23 - Let  ) ( ) ( S V S g′ ≡ λ  be the shadow price of resource stock under governance. We show that 
λ  is decreasing for  . 
* > S S
For  , the first order derivative of   is given by  
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where the first two terms follow from the Leibniz’s rule. The second-order derivative is  
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for all   because   and 
* > S S ) ( >
* S F′ ρ 0 < F ′ ′ . So the first term of   is negative. The second 
term is zero because  . The third term is negative because 
g V ′ ′
c 0 = /











∂ . It follows that  0 < ) (S ′ ′ = ) ( V S g ′ λ  for all  . Because the stock is monotonically 
decreasing under governance given  , it follows that the shadow value of resource 
increases monotonically until the stock reaches the steady state  . More precisely, the realized 
path of shadow price   satisfies 
* > S S
* > S 0 S
* S
* λ 0 < ] x ) (S )[ ) F S dS − ( = /dt ′ λ ( = S dt ′ λ /
*
t λ d  for all  
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Proof of Proposition 3 
Suppose governance involves fixed cost   and marginal governance cost  . Let  0 > C 0 ≥ g
* T  be 
the optimal timing of investment (to switch to governance).  , the steady-state harvest 
upon governance. Let 
) (
* * S F x ≡
dS
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1
2 1 τ  be the time it takes for the resource to reach 
- 24 - the level   starting from   with harvest rate  2 S 1 S x  in each instant. Let  ) , , (
*
0
* x S S τ τ ≡ . Once 


























   
Because the optimal harvest equals the open-access level  x  for any t where  , it follows 
that   (i.e. it is never optimal to invest when open access is optimal). The present value of 
governance with timing 
* > S St
* τ
* ≥ T
T  between   and 
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The first term represents the present value of harvesting until governance is adopted during 
which  x S F t = S t − ) ( & . The second term is the present value of the sum of the fixed and the 
variable governance costs. The variable cost component represents the present value of 
governance costs to restrict harvest to zero from the time governance is adopted (T ) until the 
time stock returns to the steady state level ( ) and then to   after the steady state 
is reached).  The third term is the present value of rents under governance. The discount factor 
 involves two time periods, 
,0)
* , ( S S T T τ +
* x
,0)) * ,S ( ( T S T e
τ ρ + −
T  and  . (After investment occurs at time 
, the resource stock is below the optimal steady state  . Once governance is adopted, the 
optimal harvesting rule is given by   specified above, and hence zero harvest is chosen until the 
stock recovers to the level  . The time it takes for   to increase to  , given zero harvests, is 
given by  .)▄ 
,0)
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* T Proof of part (i). Suppose 
* T
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 by the definition of 
T  and the present value of rents under open access is given by  dt x S c p e V t
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a sufficient condition for governance to be preferred to open access is  oa V x S S V ≥ )) , , ( (
*
0 τ . 
Cancelling out the common parts from both sides and arranging terms, we obtain inequality (1) 
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This inequality implies that the present value of governance when investment occurs at a time 




Proof of Proposition 4 
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where the first inequality follows because the most rapid approach path   is optimal given 
*
g S ′ g′ 
and the second inequality holds because function W  is strictly decreasing in the marginal 
governance cost  g . The proof that the gains from transition to governance is decreasing in the 
fixed cost for adopting it,  , works in a similar way. ▄  C
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Let   be the steady state under optimal governance. Governance (restricting harvest 
below   starts at time 
*
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, recall that the singular solution is 
given by  
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. The proof 
that the optimal timing for institutional transition is increasing in C  and  p  works in a similar 
way. ▄ 
 
Existence and uniqueness of the optimal governance solution with constant harvest price 
- 26 - We analyze the existence, uniqueness and the optimality of the singular solution to the optimal 
governance problem with constant harvest price. In the problem, the Hamiltonian is linear in the 
control variable. Spence and Starrett (1975) discuss the nature of the solutions to such problems. 
Following their argument, we can express the problem in terms of the state variable   alone as 
follows:  
t S
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where  . Function W  is twice continuously 
differentiable on  . If W  is single-peaked, then it is optimal to use a most-rapid approach 
path to the stock level that satisfies the singular solution,  , such that  .  
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There is a stock level S  at which  ′ ) ( = S c g p ′ +  due to the assumption on c, and hence 
. Because W  is continuous and  0 > ) (S W ′ ′ ′ 0 < ) K ( W′ , a solution to   exists between 
 and 
0 = (S Φ )
*
S′ K . With an additional assumption  , there is a unique solution. The second 
order derivative of   is given by  
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where the first two terms on the right hand side of (A2) are negative. It may not be the case that 
, and thus we need further assumptions to have a unique steady state. With the Schaefer 
model—a model commonly used in resource economics—we have 
0 < W ′ ′
0 <
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− + + − ′ ′  for all  ] (0, S K ∈  if   (the Gompertz growth 
function). Therefore, the uniqueness and the optimality of the singular solution hold for 
commonly used models. 
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